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Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the interaction between centralised carbon emissive tech-
nologies and distributed intermittent non-emissive technologies. A representative con-
sumer can satisfy his electricity demand by investing in distributed generation (solar
panels) and by buying power from a centralised firm at a price the firm sets. Dis-
tributed generation is intermittent and induces an externality cost to the consumer.
The firm provides non-random electricity generation subject to a carbon tax and to
transmission costs. The objective of the consumer is to satisfy her demand while min-
imising investment costs, payments to the firm, and intermittency costs. The objective
of the firm is to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand while minimising investment
costs, demand deviation costs, and maximising the payments from the consumer. We
formulate the investment decisions as McKean-Vlasov control problems with stochas-
tic coefficients. We provide explicit, price model-free solutions to the optimal decision
problems faced by each player, the solution of the Pareto optimum, and the laissez-
faire market situation represented by a Stackelberg equilibrium where the firm is the
leader. We find that, from the social planner’s point of view, the high adjustment
cost of centralised technology damages the development of distributed generation. The
Stackelberg equilibrium leads to significant deviation from the socially desirable ratio
of centralised versus distributed generation. In a situation where a power system is to
be built from zero, the optimal strategy of the firm is high price/low market-share, but
is low price/large market share for existing power systems. Further, from a regulation
policy, we find that a carbon tax or a subsidy to distributed technology has the same
efficiency in achieving a given level of distributed generation.
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1 Introduction
Renewable energy subsidies have led to the development of a distributed electricity gener-
ation technology (solar energy) that offers consumers an alternative source to centralised
generation. Consumers can reduce their electricity bill by investing in rooftop solar panels.
However, this source of production is intermittent. It depends on the meteorology. Thus,
consumers have to find an economic compromise between the potential reduction of their
centralised electricity bill and their exposure to the intermittency of distributed genera-
tion. On the other hand, this new technology represents a threat to centralised electricity
producers. It leads to a decrease in their revenue by reducing their demand. Thus, as a
group sharing a common interest, centralised energy producers can either reduce the price
of electricity to residential consumers to discourage them from investing in distributed gen-
eration, or they can increase their price to get higher income when the consumer’s demand
is high and distributed generation is not possible. Rooftop solar panels represent only a
part of the total installed solar capacity. But, as a means to reduce carbon emissions, it
receives significant attention from public authorities through specific subsidies that incite
consumers to install panels on the roofs of their houses and to self-consume their generation.
The economic literature has intensively studied the rationality of investment in re-
newable energy sources. The fact that energy sources require adding dispatchable and
potentially emissive generation capacity to compensate for their fluctuations has raised the
curiosity of economists (Joskow (2011) [19], Borenstein (2012) [8]). Different industrial
organisation settings have examined the question of the technological choice between in-
termittent zero-carbon emissive but costly technology compared to affordable dispatchable
emissive technology. These settings either consider the social planner’s point of view to
assess the costs and benefits of renewable technologies (Gowrisankaran et al. (2016) [14]),
perfect market competition to assess the possibility of reaching an environmental target
without public intervention (Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2016) [2, 1]), or strategic equilibrium
between an intermittent renewable energy source and a dispatchable emissive one (Aflaki
& Netessine (2017) [3]). In this paper, we study the effect of an affordable distributed
electricity generation technology on the economic equilibrium between consumers and cen-
tralised producers both from the point of view of a benevolent social planner and from a
laissez-faire dynamic. In particular, we answer the question of what is the socially desirable
share of distributed technology installed by consumers and what situation results from a
publicly uncontrolled dynamic. As our focus is on this main comparison, we refer to the
interaction between an integrated monopolistic firm with centralised electricity generation
interacting with a representative consumer of residential households 1. Thus, our model
is only concerned with the part of the total electricity consumption of a nation that is
connected to the distribution level. Nevertheless, this part represents a large portion of
the total consumption of a nation. For instance, this part represents 73% of the total
consumption in France (source: RTE annual report on electricity in France (2016)).This
abstract situation is enough to obtain a market equilibrium. In particular, we do not need
to consider the consumer’s price elasticity or competition between electricity producers.
By waiving these features, we isolate the effect induced by the existence of an affordable
technology of distributed generation available to consumers on the ratio between centralised
and decentralised energy generation and derive conclusions on the future of this technology.
Following a classic trend in investment theory, our model is set to a continuous time and
1Through out the paper, the firm will be referred as she, the consumer as he and the social planner as it.
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an infinite horizon. The firm has to decide her investment rate in a fully dispatchable non-
random carbon emissive technology subject to a carbon tax and the price for her electricity
generation. This price is the retail price. The firm commits to satisfying the consumer’s
residual demand, that is, the electricity demand not fulfilled by the solar panels, before it is
realised. Thus, her objective is to honour her commitment at the least expected discounted
investment cost. Knowing the price the firm has committed to, the consumer performs
his economic arbitrage between buying energy from the firm or investing in distributed
generation to minimise his expected discounted cost of energy.
Distributed generation is intermittent and the consumer has a disutility from its un-
timely fluctuations. Due to the complexity of acounting for the randomness of renewable
energy sources, the economic literature commonly represents it with a binomial law in a
two-time-step model (Ambec & Crampes (2015) [4], Aflaki & Netessine (2017) [3]). In
our model, we account for intermittency in the decision problem of the consumer with the
instantaneous variance of distributed generation. This feature makes the consumer’s invest-
ment problem fall into the category of a McKean-Vlasov (MKV) optimal control problem.
In this class of optimal control problems, the criteria and/or the dynamics depend on the
law of the state variable. In our case, it depends nonlinearly on the square of the expecta-
tion of the distributed energy generation. The MKV control problems have received a surge
of interest in the last few years in connection with the mean-field game theory initiated by
Lasry and Lions. Thus, we refer to [6], [10], and [23] for recent works on this topic. Our
problem falls more specifically into linear-quadratic MKV control problems, which have
been studied by [30] and [24], but mainly for finite horizons and deterministic coefficients.
Because we a priori use a generic random price process, we add the infinite horizon to this
context. Therefore, one contribution of this paper, from a mathematical point of view,
is to provide explicit solutions in this framework by relying on a suitable version of the
martingale optimality principle for control problems.
Moreover, centralised generation is characterised by the need for a transmission infras-
tructure. Thus, a tax proportional to his residual demand is added to the consumer’s
electricity bill to finance this infrastructure. Because the firm’s decisions precede the con-
sumer’s decisions, their interaction is of a Stackelberg type where the firm acts as a leader
and the consumer as a follower. We compare this laissez-faire market dynamic with the
choice that a benevolent social planer would perform to satisfy the consumer’s demand by
using the two available technologies while minimising total expected discounted costs. Our
results are focused on the stationary state of the system induced by the optimal strategy
of each player: the firm, the consumer, and the social planner.
Despite the constraints involved in the linear-quadratic setting of our model, we find
that the investment decision of each player follows the economic reasoning. The consumer
invests in distributed generation if and only if the price of centralised energy plus the
transmission cost is higher that the annuity of distributed technology. The firm invests in
centralised technology just enough to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand. Further, the
social planner decides its arbitrage between the two technologies by comparing the total
cost of centralised technology (annuity plus carbon tax) with the net cost of distributed
technology (annuity minus transmission cost).
Further, our model identifies several aspects of the interaction between centralised pro-
duction and distributed generation. First, we find that, from the perspective of the social
choice, the high adjustment cost of the centralised technology has a damaging effect not on
itself but on the development of distributed technology. While the high adjustment cost
3
of distributed technology should reduce its interest, we find that this effect is also true for
the adjustment cost of centralised technology. The reasoning is that the higher adjustment
cost of the centralised technology makes the whole power system less flexible and thus, less
prone to accommodate with intermittent source of generation. Further, the adjustment cost
has the opposite effect from the firm’s point of view: the higher the adjustment cost, the
lesser she will invest in her technology and thus, the higher the market share of distributed
technology.
Second, we find an opposite optimal strategy for the firm that depends on the initial
condition of the electric system. If at the initial time, there is neither centralised nor
distributed generation and the problem is to build from this zero situation a brand new
electric system, then the firm’s optimal strategy is a high price with a low market share.
The firm lets the distributed technology take a large share of the total demand and confines
herself to a marginal level of centralised generation but makes the consumer’s pay a high
price for this small necessary amount of dispatchable capacity. By contrast, if the initial
state of the electric system corresponds to the present observed situations where centralised
generation nearly satisfies all consumers’ demand, then the firm’s optimal strategy is a
low price with a high market share. The firm practices a low electricity price policy to
deter investment in distributed generation. Her investment costs explained these different
strategies. In the zero situation, the firm can reach a higher level of profit by minimizing
her investment cost and practicing a high price policy for her small share of dispatachable
generation than having a large and costly generation market share and practicing a low
price policy. In the present system’s situation, the firm is less efficient when bearing the
costs to disinvest and practicing a high price policy than maintaining the status quo by
practicing a low price policy and supporting no disinvestment costs.
Third, we find that the Stackelberg equilibrium significantly differs from the socially
desirable outcome. As the oligopoly pricing theory argues (Vives (1999) [28, sec. 7.4]),
the Stackelberg price is higher than the Pareto equilibrium price. This difference yields in
both initial states mentioned above to an over-investment in distributed generation. This
over-investment can be ten time higher in the market equilibrium. Using low estimates for
the cost of rooftop solar panels costs and supposing a highly flexible centralised system with
a carbon tax of 100 e/t, we find that a social investment of 20% in distributed generation
if the electric system is to be built from zero. In the same situation, the market equilibrium
results in a market share of 88% in distributed energy. With the same configuration of costs
but in a situation where the electric system already exists with mainly centralised technol-
ogy, the social optimum is to subsitute only 4% of centralised technology by distributed
energy where the market equilibrium would results in a market share of 30% of distributed
generation. Although our setting does not allow a straightforward computation of the total
costs in the market equilibrium, the differences in stationary states are so important that
there is little doubt that there is a large welfare loss.
Fourth, we find that the carbon tax and the subsidy to distributed technology have the
same efficiency in redirecting the consumer’s choice. We show that these two instruments
have the same efficiency in the sense that increasing the carbon tax or subsidising the
distributed technology by the same amount results in the same market equilibrium price,
and thus in the same stationary state. Nevertheless, we have no information on which
instrument reaches a given stationary state at the least cost because we would have to
solve a third level of stochastic control problems, namely the regulator’s optimal control
problem of the market equilibrium.
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As a consequence of these findings, we can claim that as soon as a distributed generation
technology is worth investing in for the consumers, a public intervention is required to avoid
a major deviation from social interest.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Subsection 1.1 gives an overview of the literature
related to this work. Section 2 presents our model and its hypotheses. In Section 3 we
describe the optimal behaviour of each player (firm, consumer, social planner). Section 4
provides the different possible equilibria and we conclude in Section 5.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper is related to the stream of economic literature on peak-load electricity pricing
that goes back to Boiteux (1960) [7] (see also Kleindorfer & Fernando (1993) [20]). It
also has a connection with the operations research literature on the supply chain that
commonly analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium between a producer and a supplier (see
for instance Roy et al. (1994) [26]). Actually, our paper belongs to the literature on the
development of renewable energies. It shares some concerns and results with Joskow (2011)
[19], Borenstein (2012) [8], Hirth et al. (2013) [17] on externality costs that are induced by
the intermittency in power systems. Like them, we find that a poorly flexible centralised
electric system reduces the social interest in intermittent yet non-emissive energy sources.
Our study is also related to the question of the optimal share of an intermittent source of
energy that is examined for instance in Hirth (2015) [18] and Gowrisankaran et al. (2016)
[14]. Despite our model having less detail and our focus on one particular renewable energy
technology, our results can be compared to them by looking at the social planner’s choice
when the transmission cost is zero. In this situation, the social planner has a trade-off
between two centralised technologies: one dispatchable and the other one intermittent. In
this regard, we also find that both a high carbon tax and a flexible system are required to
justify a market share of intermittent renewable energy of at most 15%. Furthermore, we
find, as in Hirth (2015), that increasing the flexibility of the centralised system reduces the
integration cost of renewable energy and thus, increases its socially desirable market share.
Moreover, Hirth (2015) finds a non-monotonic effect of the carbon tax on the development
of wind energy because of competition between the technologies. In our case, since the social
planner has access to only one non-emissive technology, we do not find this non-monotonic
effect. The distributed generation increases with the carbon tax.
Our model also sheds some light also to the question addressed in Green and Le´autier
(2015) [15] about the existence of a threshold where renewable energy would no longer need
subsidies. Indeed, if the distributed energy net cost (annuity minus transmission costs) falls
below the retail price, this technology could reach a positive level of market share. Besides,
this market share is larger under laissez-faire than the socially desirable outcome.
Our study is also related to the technological transition required for electric systems to
reduce their carbon emissions. This problem is addressed by Acemoglu et al. (2012) [2]
and Acemoglu et al. (2016) [1] in endogenous growth models with two technologies: clean
and dirty. In the first paper, the authors show that the laissez-faire equilibrium that the
market provides leads to an environmental disaster since firms make more profit in investing
in the dirty technology than in the clean one. Further, they show that a simple regulation
providing economic incentives to invest in clean technology can avoid the catastrophe. In
the second paper, the authors show that a mix of a carbon tax and a subsidy for clean
technology is necessary to reduce the social costs induced by climate change. Our analysis
does not embrace the global reduction of emissions from electric systems. But, as limited
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as this scope might be, it suggests that distributed non-emissive electricity generation
technologies might benefit from a market dynamic at a non-socially optimal level.
Our analysis also shares some results with Aflaki and Netessine’s (2017) [3] model of
competition between dispatchable emissive technology and wind technology. Indeed, in
the case when wind generation is offered an ex ante fixed price, the authors’ model is also
a Stakelberg game where the leader is the retailer choosing the fixed price and the two
producers are the followers. In this situation, the authors also find an over-investment
in renewable energy compared to the social optimum. Further, we find as in Ambec and
Crampes (2015) [4], an increasing relation between the carbon tax as a Pigouvian tax for
the externatlity that is induced by emissions and the market share of renewable energy.
However, contrary to our model, they find that the carbon tax is required on top of subsidy
mechanisms to achieve a socially optimal renewable market share because they add a bugdet
constraint on the subsidy for renewables that is equal to the tax on consumption.
Further, some features of the interaction between centralised generation and distributed
generation which are studied in the literature have been left aside in our study. For instance,
we suppose that there is no problem of measuring the distributed generation and separating
the consumer’s consumption between self-generation and demand. Nevertheless, Darghouth
et al. (2011, 2014) [11, 12] shows that net metering, that is measuring only the consumtion
minus solar generation, leads to significant benefits for the consumer. Also, Brown et al.
(2014) [9] find that measuring both the demand and the self-generation is necessary to
reach a social optimum. This feature could be added as a mere hypothesis to our model
without changing the results. It might not be same the same if we relax the hypothesis that
the transmission cost is a linear function of the residual demand. Indeed, in our model,
the distribution operator is not represented as the regulated economic agent that it is. Lim
and Yurukoglu (2017) [21] show and quantify precisely the over-investment in distributed
generation that is induced by the frictions in its regulation activity, mainly uncertainty
in the regulated rate of return and the asymetry of information between the distribution
operator and the regulator. Thus, the action of the distribution operator can distort our
results in the sense of a lower market share of distributed technology because of a too
high transmission tariff. Nevertheless, assessing precisely how this effect would occur by
accounting for the distribution operator as a regulated operator subject to moral hazard is
left for future research.
2 Model and problem formulation
We consider a firm which provides electricity with centralised fully dispatchable generation
(typically coal- or gas-fired plants) to a representative consumer who can also produce his
own electricity by investing in solar panels. Both of these sources of electricity can satisfy
the consumer’s demand for electricity. The problem for the consumer is to decide how
many solar panels he must install. But, the firm has to satisfy the residual demand of the
consumer with her generation plants while minimising her production costs and accounting
for the carbon taxes due to emission of thermal energy. Further, we consider a social
planner who is looking for a price of the centralised generation which is Pareto-optimal for
the firm and the consumer.
We mathematically formulate the model and the optimisation problem for each actor
in this two-player game. We fix some probability space (Ω,F ,P) that is equipped with a
filtration F = (Ft)t≥0 that satisfies the usual conditions and that supports two independent
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standard Brownian motions W and W 0. The consumer’s cumulative installed capacity of
distributed generation at any time t is denoted by Xαt and is governed by:
dXαt = bαtdt+ σX
α
t dWt, t ≥ 0, Xα0 = x0 ∈ R, (2.1)
where the F-adapted control process α = (αt)t≥0 represents the solar panel installation rate
(αt > 0 means that the consumer buys the solar panel at time t, while αt < 0 means that
the consumer sells them), and b > 0 is the load factor of the solar panels. Typically, the
installation rate αt is measured in megawatts per unit of time, and b is a dimensionless
parameter. The parameter σ > 0 is a volatility coefficient related to the uncertainty in the
net available electricity capacity of solar panels. The proportional term w.r.t. Xαt in the
noise means that theuncertainty increases with the level of generation. This model captures
the increase in volatility with the increase in the share of the intermittent energy source. In
this regard, the model captures the fact that for any consumer, there is always a possibility
of not having generation from his own generation capacity due, for instance, to a lack of
sun. But, a shock has a permanent effect while there should be a stationary variance for a
given level of installed capacity. Nevertheless, the discounting factor mitigates this spurious
feature of the distributed generation dynamics.
The demand process of the consumer, denoted by D, is an exogenous factor in our
model, and is assumed to be constant. Indeed, the problem of the consumer as well as
the social planner is to make an arbitrage between non-emissive intermittent technology
and emissive dispatchable technology. Uncertainty on the demand only complicates the
computations without bringing more insights on the choices of the consumer or the social
planner. Another way of justifying this hypothesis is to consider that the volatility σ is the
net uncertainty generated from the distributed generation plus demand.
In order to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand at any time t, the consumer purchases
electricity from the firm at price Pt chosen by the firm. The price process (Pt)t≥0 should not
be considered as a wholesale day-ahead hourly spot price quoted on electricity markets that
fluctuates according to the realisation of the hourly demand and might reach sky-rocketed
values in case of unexpected high demand level. The firm’s price is a commitment to satisfy
the consumer’s residual demand whatever its level. Indeed, in electricity markets worldwide,
there is a large variety in the electricity pricing schemes for residential consumers (flat rate,
two part tariffs, time-of-use, critical peak pricing...). But, these pricing mechanisms share
a common principle: the price of electricity consumption for a residential consumer is
determined before its consumption is realized and remains valid for a long period of time
(from one year to several years). Thus, within the limit of his subscription, that is, the
maximum power he can take from the grid, the consumer can consume as much as he likes
at the price written by the producer. Hence, the price Pt should be interpreted as a single
part tariff at which the firm commits to satisfy consumer’s residual demand. In this regard,
at time t, Pt is the price the firm commits to until time t+ dt where dt can be considered
a year. Further, for this reason, the price process P = (Pt)t≥0 is adapted with respect to
the filtration F0 = (F0t )t≥0 that is generated by W 0. In other words, we assume that the
price of the centralised generation is not affected by local issues, but only by global issues.
However, we do not make a priori model assumptions on the price process since it will be
endogenously derived by equilibrium arguments.
Over an infinite horizon, the expected total discounted cost of the consumer for an
installation rate α is:
Jc(α) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1(αt) + (Pt + θ)(D −Xαt ) + ηVar[Xαt ]
)
dt
]
, (2.2)
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where ρ > 0 is some discount factor which we assume large enough to ensure the well-
posedness of our problem and, in particular, to kill the persistent effect of the shocks on the
dynamics of the distributed generation. The first term C1(αt) represents the instantaneous
installation cost for photovoltaics where C1 is a convex function on R, C1(0) = 0 which we
assume in the sequel to be in the quadratic form:
C1(a) = ca+ γa
2,
where c ≥ 0 is the per unit constant cost of distributed power, and γ > 0 is an adjustment
cost. The hypothesis of a constant cost c of distributed energy is challenging because, in
real life, an important decrease in per unit cost of renewable energy sources has occurred in
the last 20 years, because of both economies of scale, learning by doing and technological
progress (see Reichelstein et al. [25] and Rubin et al. [27]). Nevertheless, in our model, we
assume that the system has already reached a situation where it is economicaly interesting
for the consumer to invest in solar panels2. The quadratic term of the cost function captures
the adjustment costs. The consumer pays this cost to increase or to decrease his capacity.
This term captures the cost of adapting generation to demand.
The second term (θ + Pt)(D −Xαt ) is the cost for satisfying the residual demand with
the centralised electricity. The parameter θ represents the costs that add up to the energy
price Pt on the consumer’s electricity bill due to the necessary transmission and distribution
infrastructure that are required to bring centralised generation to his house. In this regard,
the parameter θ measures the extra cost that is induced by centralised generation compared
to distributed generation. The cost θ is of the same order of magnitude as the price for
energy Pt. For instance, in France the regulated price of electricity for residential consumers
is about 44.7 e/MWh, while the transmission cost is about 45.5 e/MWh (source: French
energy regulator website, 2016). In this model, we assume that θ is exogenous and fixed.
This cost function captures the first order effect that the more the consumer is using
centralised energy, the more he is using the transmission infrastructure and thus, the more
he has to pay to finance it. The third term represents the preference of the consumer
for low-variance policies to be less sensitive to the market risk of a centralised electricity
price. The parameter η measures the consumer’s aversion to intermittency, but can also
be interpreted as the cost to mitigate the variance of the distributed generation. In this
regard, it is bounded by the cost of storage technologies, such as chemical batteries, that
can provide a way to reduce the effect of intermittency while maintaining the consumer’s
independence from the grid. The consumer has to decide the installation rate of solar panels
α while minimising the expected total discounted cost Jc(α) in (2.2). The solution to this
problem is studied in Section 3.1.
Knowing the distributed generation profile of the consumer, the firm has to choose
its centralised generation capacity for satisfying his residual demand while accounting the
operational costs, the gain from the sale of electricity to the consumer, and carbon taxes
for carbon emission. We denote Qν as the firm’s cumulative production of centralised
generation given by the dynamics
dQνt = νtdt, t ≥ 0, Qν0 = q0 ∈ R, (2.3)
where ν = (νt)t≥0 is an F-adapted real-valued process, which represents the capacity in-
stallation rate. However, compared to the generation from distributed generation, there is
2In some landers of Germany for instance, solar panels installation has already reached grid parity,
which means that electricity generated by solar panels is cheaper than electricity bought from the grid plus
transmission cost.
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no uncertainty in centralised generation. It captures the fact that centralised generation
is fully dispatchable. Given a level of distributed generation capacity Xα, the aim of the
energy firm is to minimise over its installation rate ν of centralised generation capacity at
the expected total discounted cost:
Jf (ν;X
α) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C2(νt) + λ
(
D −Xαt −Qνt
)2 − Pt(D −Xαt ) + piQνt )dt]. (2.4)
The first term in (2.4) represents the production cost, and, as we did for the distributed
technology, we consider a quadratic cost function of the form:
C2(u) = hu+ δu
2,
where h > 0 is the per unit cost of the centralised capacity and δ > 0 is the adjustment
cost parameter similar to the cost function of the firm. The second term implements the
commitment of the firm to satisfying the consumer’s residual demand. This quadratic pe-
nalisation compels the firm to fit the residual demand of the consumer with her generation.
The third term is the gain from the sale of centralised generation to the consumer at price
Pt. Although the consumer pays the centralised energy θ + Pt, the firm only receives Pt.
The fourth term represents a carbon tax for the emission of thermal energy, where pi > 0 is
a constant. Setting pi to zero represents either an emissive technology in a world without a
carbon tax or a non-emissive centralised generation. Note that the corresponding optimal
centralised capacity Qˆ = Qˆ(Xα) for the firm depends on the distributed generation Xα of
the consumer. The solution to this problem is studied in Section 3.2.
Besides the consumer and the centralised firm, we consider a social planner whose aim
is to minimise the sum of expected costs from the distributed and centralised generations
using the investment rate pair (α, ν):
J(α, ν) = Jc(α) + Jf (ν;X
α) (2.5)
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
C1(αt) + C2(νt) + θ(D −Xαt ) + piQνt
+ ηVar[Xαt ] + λ
(
D −Xαt −Qνt
)2)]
.
This problem is studied in Section 3.3. The corresponding optimal distributed and cen-
tralised generation capacities are denoted by (X∗, Q∗). Note that in the objective function
of the social planner, we account for the transmission infrastructure costs as well as the
emission costs are taken while the energy price cost has disappeared since it is only a trans-
fer between the consumer and the firm. After determining the social optimum, the goal
of the social planner is to find an equilibrium price P ∗ that would implement this social
optimum. If such equilibrium quantities exist, we will call them Pareto efficient and if it
is possible to find a price that implements them, we will call this price Pareto equilibrium
price. We will compare the Pareto optimum and the Pareto equilibrium price to a pure
market situation between the firm and the consumer. In this market situation, the firm acts
as a leader which offers a price to the consumer (the follower), and the endogenous price
that might result from this game is called a Stackelberg equilibrium. Further, since we are
mainly interested in the existence of a long-term stationary state of these two problems (the
Pareto and the Stackelberg equilibria), we will limit our analysis to asymptotic equilibria.
These equilibria are addressed in Section 4.
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3 Optimal behaviour of the players
In this section, we address the optimisation problems for the consumer, the firm and the
social planner, and determine their optimal generation investment rate explicitly.
3.1 The consumer’s problem
From the expression (2.2) of the expected total discounted cost of the consumer, and by
removing the term (Pt + θ)D that does not depend on the installation rate control α, the
consumer’s problem is written as
V˜ C = inf
α∈A
Jc(α) = D
(∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE[Pt]dt+
θ
ρ
)
+ V C ,
V C = inf
α∈A
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtft(Xαt ,E[Xαt ], αt)dt
]
,
(3.1)
where {ft(x, x¯, a), (x, x¯, a) ∈ R3, t ≥ 0} is the F0-adapted random field defined by
ft(x, x¯, a) = ca+ γa
2 − (θ + Pt)x+ η(x2 − x¯2). (3.2)
Here A is the set of admissible controls that is defined as the set of F-adapted real-valued
processes α s.t. E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρt|αt|2dt] < ∞. We assume that the positive discount factor ρ
satisfies:
ρ > σ2, (3.3)
which from Itoˆ’s formula on (2.1), Young’s inequality and Gronwall’s lemma means that
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Xαt |2dt
]
≤
(
x20 +
b
ε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsE[|αs|2]ds
)∫ ∞
0
e−(ρ−σ
2−εb)sds < ∞, (3.4)
for ε > 0 small enough. We also assume that the price process satisfies the square-
integrability condition:
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Pt|2dt
]
< ∞, (3.5)
which ensures by (3.4) that problem (3.1) is well-defined. Problem (3.1) is a nonstandard
stochastic control problem due to the variance term, which induces a priori time inconsis-
tency. It belongs to the class of so-called McKean-Vlasov (MKV) control problems where
the running cost ft in (3.2) involves the law of the state process X
α in a nonlinear depen-
dence coming from the square of its mean. McKean-Vlasov control problems have received
a surge of interest in the last few years in connection with the mean-field game theory
initiated by Lasry and Lions, and we refer for example to [6], [10], and [23] for recent
works on this topic. Problem (3.1) falls more specifically into the class of linear-quadratic
MKV control problems with random coefficients that have been recently studied in [5]. The
method of resolution of (3.1) is based on a mean version of martingale optimality principle
in dynamic programming leading to the following verification argument.
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Lemma 3.1 (Optimality principle). Let {V α, α ∈ A} be a family of F-adapted processes
in the form V αt = vt(X
α
t ,E[Xαt ]), t ≥ 0, for some random field F-adapted process {vt(x, x¯),
(x, x¯) ∈ R2, t ≥ 0} satisfying the following conditions:
(i) there exist a positive constant C and a F-adapted process (It)t≥0 such that E[e−ρT IT ]
→ 0 as T →∞ and that |vt(x, x¯)| ≤ C(It + |x|2 + |x¯|2), for t ≥ 0 and (x, x¯) ∈ R2;
(ii) for all α ∈ A, the map t ∈ R+ 7→ E[Sαt ], with Sαt = e−ρtV αt +
∫ t
0 e
−ρsfs(Xαs ,E[Xαs ], αs)ds,
is nondecreasing;
(iii) there exists some αˆ ∈ A such that the map t ∈ R+ 7→ E[Sαˆt ] is constant.
Then αˆ is an optimal control for problem (3.1) and V C = E[v0(x0, x0)]. Moreover, any
other optimal control satisfies the condition (iii).
Proof. Let α ∈ A and T > 0. Setting fαt := ft(Xαt ,E[Xαt ], αt), from (ii) we get
E[v0(x0, x0)] = E[V α0 ] = E[Sα0 ] ≤ E[SαT ] = E
[
e−ρTV αT +
∫ T
0
e−ρsfαs ds
]
. (3.6)
By (i) and (3.4) we have E[e−ρT |V αT |] → 0 as T → ∞; hence, by sending T to infinity
into (3.6) and by using the dominated convergence theorem (ft satisfies a quadratic growth
condition), we have E[v0(x0, x0)] ≤ E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρsfαs ds] and then E[v0(x0, x0)] ≤ V C , since α
is arbitrary in A. Similarly, by (iii) we obtain E[v0(x0, x0)] = E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρsf αˆs dt] ≥ V C , so
that αˆ is an optimal control and V C = E[v0(x0, x0)]. Suppose now that α˜ ∈ A is another
optimal control. For all T > 0 we have
E[Sα˜0 ] = V C = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtf α˜t dt
]
= E[Sα˜T ] + E
[ ∫ ∞
T
f α˜s ds− e−ρTV α˜T
]
,
so that, by sending T to infinity, we get E[Sα˜0 ] = limT→∞ E[Sα˜T ]. Since the map t 7→ E[Sα˜t ]
is nondecreasing, this result shows that it is actually constant. 2
Remark 3.1. The verification conditions (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 3.1 are weaker than the
usual conditions for martingale optimality principle in stochastic control (see [13]). This
principle requires that Sα is a supermartingale for all α, and a martingale for some αˆ. In the
case of a standard stochastic control problem, one looks for a family of processes V α in the
form V αt = vt(X
α
t ), and the classical martingale optimality principle is used in practice by
applying Itoˆ’s formula to Sαt and then deriving a dynamic programming Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation (or a backward stochastic differential equation in the case of random
coefficients) for the (random) value function vt(x) from the non-positivity of the drift of S
α
for any α (supermartingale condition), and the cancellation of the drift of Sαˆ (martingale
condition). In our McKean-Vlasov framework, this martingale optimality principle cannot
be used in practice for finding the solution to the control problem, and we instead exploit
the weaker version in Lemma 3.1 where the optimality principle is formulated on the mean
of Sα. This is the purpose of the next paragraph. 2
We explain here how to exploit the mean martingale optimality principle in Lemma 3.1
for solving problem (3.1). The technical details and complete rigorous derivation are post-
poned in Appendix A.1. Given the linear-quadratic structure of our MKV control problem,
we look for a candidate random value function vt(x, x¯) in the form:
vt(x, x¯) = Kt(x− x¯)2 + Λtx¯2 + Ytx+Rt, (3.7)
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for some F-adapted processes K, Λ, Y and R to be determined. Because the randomness
in the coefficients of the consumer’s problem comes only from the F0-adapted price process
P in the linear term in ft, we search for deterministic K, Λ, and F0-adapted processes Y .
The process R can also be assumed to be deterministic, without loss of generality. Hence,
we assume
dKt = K˙tdt, dΛt = Λ˙tdt,
dYt = Y˙tdt+ Z
Y
t dW
0
t , dRt = R˙tdt,
for some deterministic processes K˙, Λ˙, R˙, and F0-adapted processes Y˙ , ZY . Next, applying
Itoˆ’s formula to Sαt = e
−ρtvt(Xαt ,E[Xαt ]) +
∫ t
0 e
−ρsfs(Xαs ,E[Xαs ], αs)ds, for α ∈ A, and
taking the expectation, we get
dE[Sαt ] = e−ρtE[Dαt ]dt,
for some F-adapted processes Dα with
E[Dαt ] = E
[
− ρvt(Xαt ,E[Xαt ]) +
d
dt
E
[
vt(X
α
t ,E[Xαt ])
]
+ ft(X
α
t ,E[Xαt ], αt)
]
, t ≥ 0. (3.8)
According to Lemma 3.1, to ensure that the conditions (ii) and (iii) of the optimality
principles are satisfied, we have to determine K, Λ, Y , Γ, and R so that
E[Dαt ] ≥ 0, t ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ A, and E[Dαˆt ] = 0, t ≥ 0, for some αˆ ∈ A. (3.9)
If we find such a αˆ, it is an optimal control. We apply Itoˆ’s formula to vt(X
α
t ,E[Xαt ])
together with square completion and obtain:
E[Dαt ] = E
[
γ
(
αt −A(Xαt ,E[Xαt ],Kt,Λt, Yt)
)2
(3.10)
+ F (Kt, K˙t)
(
Xαt − E[Xαt ]
)2
+G(Kt,Λt, Λ˙t)
(
E[Xαt ]
)2
+ Ht(Kt,Λt, Yt,E[Yt], Y˙t)Xαt + M(Yt, Rt, R˙t)
]
, t ≥ 0, ∀α ∈ A,
where A, F , G, H, and M are explicit functions of their arguments (see Appendix A.1). It
follows that condition (3.9) is realised whenever the following equations are satisfied
F (Kt, K˙t) = 0, G(Kt,Λt, Λ˙t) = 0, t ≥ 0, (3.11)
Ht(Kt,Λt, Yt,E[Yt], Y˙t) = 0, M(Yt, Rt, R˙t) = 0, t ≥ 0,
and
αˆt = A(X
αˆ
t ,E[X αˆt ],Kt,Λt, Yt), t ≥ 0. (3.12)
The explicit resolution of these equations leads to a closed-form expression for the opti-
mal distributed generation for the consumer, which is given in Appendix A.1. We provide
in the following proposition whose proof is also given in Appendix A.1, the consumer’s
expected long-run behaviour.
12
Proposition 3.1. Let (3.3) and (3.5) hold, and assume that the price process admits a
stationary limit in expectation P > 0. Then, the optimal expected cumulative production of
distributed generation admits a stationary level:
X̂∞(P ) :=
P + θ − ρcb
2σ2Kc
, (3.13)
where
Kc :=
γ
2b2
(
− (ρ− σ2) +
√
(ρ− σ2)2 + 4b
2η
γ
)
, (3.14)
and the expected investment rate in distributed generation tends to zero.
The stationarity in prices occurs for example when the price process is a martingale, in
which case P = P0, or when it is mean-reverting (following, e.g., an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck or
a Cox-Ingersoll-Ross process) with a stationary level of P . Thus, it is not an uncommon
situation for electricity prices for residential consumers that are measured in real terms.
The relation in (3.13) states that the consumer has an inverse demand function D −
X̂∞(P ) with an absolute elasticity of 1/(2σ2Kc). The spread P + θ− ρc/b is the difference
for the consumer between the cost of centralised energy and distributed energy (ρc/b is
the annuity in e/MWh of distributed energy). The consumer invests in distributed energy
only if this difference is positive. The consumer’s behaviour is not driven here by his
demand level but by the relative cost of centralised electricity compared to distributed
generation. Thus, in particular, high centralised energy prices might induce an investment
in distributed generation that exceeds his demand. Therefore, it corresponds to long-term
stationary prices between P0 and PD , with
P0 := ρc/b− θ, PD := P0 + 2σ2KcD. (3.15)
The consumer’s investment will be proportional to this spread and inversely proportional
to the volatility of the distributed generation. Thus, the higher the volatility, the lower the
consumer’s investment in distributed generation is. The same results hold for the effect of
the variance penalisation parameter η. The less the consumer is averse to intermittency,
the more he will invest in distributed generation. The adjustment cost parameter γ also
has a downward effect on the consumer’s investment.
3.2 The firm’s problem
This section starts with the expression (2.4) of the expected total discounted cost of the
firm and removes the terms that are not affected by the centralised production. Thus, given
a distributed generation production Xα, the firm’s problem is:
V˜ F (Xα) = inf
α∈A
Jf (ν;X
α) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(λ(D −Xαt )2 − Pt(D −Xαt ))dt
]
+ V F (Xα),
V F (Xα) = inf
ν∈V
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt`t(Qνt , νt)dt
]
,
(3.16)
where {`t(q, u), (q, u) ∈ R2, t ≥ 0} is the F0-adapted random field defined by
`t(q, u) = hu+ δu
2 + (pi − 2λ(D −Xαt )) q + λq2. (3.17)
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Here V is the set of F-adapted real-valued processes ν s.t. E[∫∞0 e−ρt|νt|2dt] < ∞, which
means that E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρt|Qνt |2dt] < ∞. Because E[
∫∞
0 e
−ρt|Xαt |2dt] < ∞ for α ∈ A, the prob-
lem (3.16) is well-defined. Problem (3.16) fits into the class of linear-quadratic stochastic
control problems with random coefficients and an infinite horizon.
We can solve the problem by following the same martingale optimality principle as
for the consumer’s problem, although without the McKean-Vlasov dependence (see Re-
mark 3.1). Theorem A.2 in Appendix A.2 provides the closed-form expression for the opti-
mal centralised generation production of the firm. We focus here on its expected long-term
behaviour.
Proposition 3.2. When the distributed production process has an expected stationary level
Xα∞ > 0, the optimal cumulative production of centralised generation also admits an expected
stationary level given by:
Q̂∞(Xα) := D −Xα∞ −
pi + ρh
2λ
, (3.18)
and the investment rate in centralised generation tends to zero. In particular, if the price
process admits a stationary level P > 0, Proposition 3.1 shows that the optimal distributed
generation admits a stationary level X̂∞, and thus, the limit of the centralised production
reads as:
Q̂∞(P ) := D − X̂∞(P )− pi + ρh
2λ
. (3.19)
In the long-term, the firm invests to reach the level of the long-term value of the residual
demand D − X̂∞ up to a correcting term that depends on the relative cost of the penalty
for commitment λ and the investment cost in the centralised technology. Normally, to
ensure the commitment of the producer, the value of λ exceeds this cost, which makes this
correcting term negligible compared to the residual demand of the consumer.
3.3 The social planner’s problem
The social planner’s problem, which consists in minimising the expected total costs of the
consumer and the firm, is written as
V˜ S = inf
α∈A, ν∈V
J(α, ν) =
θD + λD2
ρ
+ V S ,
V S = inf
α∈A, ν∈V
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρtgt(Xαt ,E[Xαt ], Qνt , αt, νt)dt
]
,
(3.20)
where {gt(x, x¯, q, a, u), (x, x¯, q, a, u) ∈ R5, t ≥ 0} is the F0-adapted random field defined by
gt(x, x¯, q, a, u) = ca+ γa
2 + hu+ δu2 + (η + λ)x2 − ηx¯2 + λq2 + 2λxq
− (2λD + θ)x+ (pi − 2λD)q.
Problem (3.20) belongs to the class of linear-quadratic McKean-Vlasov control problems
in dimension 2. It is solved by the same martingale optimality principle as described
in Section 3.1. The closed-form expression for the optimal distributed and centralised
generation determined by the social planner are given in Appendix A.3. We provide here
the social planner’s long-run behaviour.
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Proposition 3.3. The expected optimal cumulative installed capacities of the social plan-
ner’s problem admit stationary levels:
X∗∞ :=
ρh+ pi − (ρcb − θ)
2σ2K11
, (3.21)
Q∗∞ := D −X∗∞ −
pi + ρh
2λ
, (3.22)
where K11 is a constant solution of the stochastic Ricatti algebraic system given in (A.19)
of Appendix A.3.
The social planner invests in centralised generation with the same decision rule as the
firm. The investment level is not necessarily the same as the firm since it depends on
the level of distributed generation. But the arbitrage is guided by the same rule. The
social planner satisfies the residual demand of the consumer with centralised energy up to
the same correcting term as the firm. Thus, the main point is the arbitrage of the social
planner regarding distributed generation. The social planner compares the total cost of the
centralised technology ρh+ pi with the net cost of distributed generation ρc/b− θ because
the latter avoids investing in transmission. A necessary and sufficient condition for the
social planner to invest in distributed generation is that its net cost ρc/b− θ is lower than
the total cost of the centralised generation ρh + pi. When both quantities are equal, this
situation is refered to as grid parity in the economic literature. The level of investment in
distributed generation is determined by the factor 2σ2K11. The constant K11 depends on
the strength of the commitment to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand (λ) and on the
adjustment costs γ of the consumer and δ of the firm. Since an increase in the adjustment
cost δ makes the centralised technology more costly than the distributed technology, there
should be a positive impact of δ on the distributed technology investment and, on the
contrary, there should be a negative impact of γ on the distributed technology investment.
This is not the case. It is shown in Appendix A.3 that K11 is an increasing function of γ
and δ. They both have a negative impact on the intermittent technology investment. This
result leads to the following property.
Property 3.1. A centralised generation technology with poor flexibility damages the social
investment in distributed technology.
This property can be explained in the following way. A direct analysis of system (A.19)
shows that K11 goes to infinity when the commitment penalty λ becomes large, which
makes the quantity invested in distributed generation goes to zero. Thus, the stonger
the commitment to satisfy the consumer’s residual demand, the less the social planner is
prone to invest in an intermittent technology that constantly deviates from satisfying the
consumer’s demand. The only way to mitigate this effect is to have a flexible system, that
is a system where the adjustment costs of the centralised and the distributed generation
are both small. Or as the economic literature shows, the more an intermittent technology
is introduced into an electric system, the more it induces externality cost to insure demand
satisfaction while compensating for their fluctuations (see Joskow (2011) [19], Borenstein
(2012) [8], Hirth (2015) [18]).
Further, this model can assess the situation where the initial condition of the energy
system is such that there is no distributed generation and all of the demand is satisfied
with centralised generation. This is the most common situation for power systems in
OECD countries. Althought our model does not explicity accounts for disinvestment cost,
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we can examine this situation by setting h = 0, because the firm cannot resell her assets.
We can also consider that the adjustment cost represents the decommissioning cost. Thus,
in this situation, the expected optimal cumulative production chosen by the social planner
for the distributed technology resolves in:
pi − (ρcb − θ)
2σ2K11
,
which is unlikely to be positive, unless the centralised generation technology is sufficiently
emissive to justify a high level of carbon tax. Thus, the socially desirable long-term arbitrage
between distributed generation and centralised generation depends on the initial state of
the system. This remark provides the reasoning behind the question Why would the social
planner subsitute centralised generation with distributed generation if the former does not
yield some externality? For instance, in Norway where all electricity consumption is satisfied
with non-emissive hydrogeneration, the development of solar energy can not be based on
emission saving arguments.
4 Equilibrium prices
In this section, we examine now the existence of long-term equilibrium prices. We address
two types of equilibrium: Pareto and Stackelberg.
For the Pareto equilibrium price, the social planner looks for a price that leads the
firm and the consumer to invest the quantities that are socially desirable. We focus on the
long-term stationary level of investment. If the long-term decisions taken by both players
are the same as what the social planner would do for a given long-term stationary energy
price, we call this situation an asymptotic Pareto efficient equilibrium. The resulting price
is called an asymptotic Pareto price. This equilibrium corresponds to what a light-handed
regulator can achieve.
We also consider a pure market-type equilibrium when the firm and the consumer agree
on a price without public intervention. The timing of the investment decisions and commit-
ments make this situation fit the framework of a Stakelberg game. The firm announces her
level of investment and the price to which she commits to satisfy the consumer’s residual de-
mand. Then because the consumer knows the price of centralised electricity, he decides on
his investment in distributed generation. Because we focus on asymptotic investment values
and prices, we denote this equilibrium, if it exists, an asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium
and an asymptotic Stackelberg price.
4.1 Asymptotic Pareto efficiency
Recall that X̂ = X̂(P ) is the optimal distributed generation production with control αˆ
= αˆ(P ) for the consumer given the price P for the centralised energy of the firm, Q̂ =
Q̂(X̂(P )) is the optimal centralised generation capacity with optimal control νˆ = νˆ(X̂(P ))
for the firm given the optimal distributed generation capacity X̂ of the consumer, and
(X∗, Q∗) is the optimal pair of distributed/centralised generation capacities with control
(α∗, ν∗) determined by the social planner. Thus, a Pareto equilibrium price is a price
process P ∗ = (P ∗t )t such that the optimal installed capacities for the consumer and the
firm coincide with the ones of the social planner:
X̂t(P
∗) = X∗t , (4.1)
Q̂t(Xˆ(P
∗)) = Q∗t . (4.2)
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Note that the equation(4.2) is always satisfied, for any price process P . Indeed, by definition
of the social planner’s problem, given a fixed P , we have:
V S = J(α∗, ν∗) = inf
α∈A,ν∈V
J(α, ν) ≤ J(α∗, νˆ(X∗)),
which means that Jf (ν
∗;X∗)≤ Jf (νˆ(X∗);X∗). Because νˆ(X∗) is the unique optimal control
of infν∈V Jf (ν;X∗), this shows that ν∗ = νˆ(X∗), that is,
Q̂t(X̂(P )) = Q
∗
t .
The complex formulae for X̂t(P ) and X
∗
t in terms of the price process Pt given in
Appendix A.1 and A.3 do not produce a closed-form expression for a Pareto equilibrium
price process P ∗t . Instead, we limit our considerations to long-run equilibria.
Definition 4.1. An asymptotic Pareto optimum price is a constant P ∗ such that
X̂∞(P ∗) = X∗∞. (4.3)
An asymptotic Pareto optimum price P ∗ is said to be admissible if it is positive, if the
expected long-term centralised production is positive and if the expected long-term distributed
generation is positive and does not exceed the demand.
We provide existence and characterisation results for an admissible asymptotic Pareto
optimum price.
Proposition 4.1. If ρc/b−θ ≤ ρh+pi, then there is a unique admissible asymptotic Pareto
optimum price that is given by:
P ∗ :=
(
1− Kc
K11
)(ρc
b
− θ)+ Kc
K11
(
ρh+ pi
)
. (4.4)
The relation (4.4) is obtained by equating relation (3.21) with relation (3.13). The
Pareto equilibrium price is a convex combination of P0 and of the cost of the centralised
technology seen from the firm (ρh + pi). Indeed, Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.3 shows that
K11 is always greater than Kc. The condition on the parameters insures that X
∗∞ lies
between zero and D and thus, that P ∗ lies between P0 (no distributed technology) and PD
(only distributed technology).
4.2 Asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium
We consider here a Stackelberg equilibrium where the firm is viewed as a leader that offers
a price to the consumer, who is the follower). The firm knows the optimal distributed
generation X̂ = X̂(P ), and looks for an equilibrium price minimising its total cost in (2.4),
Jf (ν; X̂(P )) = Jf (ν, P ; X̂(P )), where we now stress the dependence of the cost on the price.
The Stackelberg problem for the firm is then formulated as:
inf
(ν,P )
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
hνt + δν
2
t − Pt
(
D − X̂t(P )
)
(4.5)
+ piQνt + λ
(
D − X̂t(P )−Qνt
)2)
dt
]
.
If an optimal control (ν, P ) to this problem exists, then P  is a Stackelberg equilibrium
price. Unfortunately, given the expression of X̂(P ) that is detailed in Appendix A.1,
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the problem (4.5) is intractable. So, we resume our analysis on the long-term expected
behaviour of the agents in this situation.
Consider a stationary situation for the consumer X̂∞(P ), then, the stationary Stackel-
berg problem of the firm is
inf
P
inf
ν
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
hνt + δν
2
t − P
(
D − X̂∞(P )
)
(4.6)
+ piQνt + λ
(
D − X̂∞(P )−Qνt
)2)
dt
]
.
For a fixed long-term price P , the firm minimises the cost to reach the optimal level of
centralised capacity. This problem is deterministic, since the price is constant and Qν has
no stochastic part. Because the long-term level of distributed generation is an increasing
linear function of the long-term price, the firm can hope to find a long-term price P that
would minimise his total cost. The following definition reflects this idea.
Definition 4.2. An asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium price is a solution P  of the optimi-
sation problem (4.6). It is said to be admissible if it is positive, if the long-term centralised
capacity is positive, and if the long-term distributed capacity is positive and lower than the
demand.
However, unlike the Pareto case, a Stackelberg equilibrium is not necessarily an asymp-
totic Stackelberg equilibrium. We provide existence and characterisation results for an
admissible asymptotic Stackelberg equilibrium price.
Proposition 4.2. Let
PF (q) :=
λδ
ρδ +Kf
( ρh+ pi
ρδ +Kf
− 2ρq
)
, ξ := 2 +
λ
σ2Kc
(
1− λδ
(ρδ +Kf )2
)
,
with Kc,Kf given by (A.3)-(A.12) in Appendix A.1 and A.2. Let q be the firm’s initial
capacity, and assume that PF (q) ≤ PD . Then, there is a unique Stackelberg asymptotic
equilibrium price that is given by:
P (q) :=
(
1− 1
ξ
)
PD +
1
ξ
PF (q), (4.7)
with PD given by (3.15).
Remark 4.1. We denote P 0
F
:= PF (0) =
λδ
(ρδ+Kf )2
(ρh + pi) and P 0 := P (0) the values
of PF (q) and P
(q) when the initial state holds no centralised nor distributed generation.
Besides, we denote P˜D
F
:= PF (D− pi2λ) = λδρδ+Kf
(
pi
ρδ+Kf
+ ρpiλ −2ρD
)
and P˜ 
D
:=
(
1− 1ξ
)
PD +
1
ξ P˜
D
F
, the values of PF (q) and P
(q) when at initial condition, there is no distributed
generation and the firm holds D − pi2λ capacity and where we suppose h = 0. 2
Proof. Using Remark A.1 from Appendix A.2, the value function of the firm is given by:
V˜ F (P ) =
1
ρ
(
λH(P )2 − PH(P ))− 1
4δρ
(
Y0(P ) + h
)2
+ Y0(P )q +Kfq
2,
with q the initial installed centralised capacity, H(P ) := D − X̂∞(P ) and
Y0(P ) = −2 λδ
ρδ +Kf
H(P ) +
δpi −Kfh
ρδ +Kf
.
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The first order condition with respect to P gives:
2λH(P )H ′(P )−H(P )− PH ′(P )− 1
2δ
(Y0(P ) + h)Y
′
0(P ) + ρqY
′
0(P ) = 0.
Because 2σ2KH(P ) = PD−P , and denoting PF (q) :=
λδ
ρδ +Kf
( ρh+ pi
ρδ +Kf
−2ρq), the direct
algebraic calculation yields:
P =
(
1− 1
ξ
)
PD +
1
ξ
PF (q),
with ξ := 2 +
λ
σ2Kc
(
1− λδ
(ρδ +Kf )2
)
. We have (Kf + ρδ)
2 = 14
(
ρδ+
√
ρ2δ2 + 4λδ
)2
> λδ.
Thus, ξ is greater than two. The price P is clearly positive and needs to be lower than PD
to be admissible. This last condition is satisfied as soon as PF (q) is lower than PD . 2
The Stackelberg stationary level is also a compromise between two prices. The price PD
is the long-term stationary price for which the consumer will saturate all his demand with
distributed generation. The price PF (q) is the long-term marginal cost of investment of the
firm when the consumer is fulfilling all his demand with distributed generation. Indeed,
Proposition 3.2 shows that when the consumer invests a level of distributed generation equal
to D, the firm wants to disinvest the quantity ρh+pi2λ . Thus, even if the firm’s investments
are not truly needed in this case, it will cost her a little.
4.3 Comparison
We now compare the different equilibria tat are defined in the previous sections and deduce
the economical implication for the regulation of the market for distributed generation.
Proposition 4.3. If the commitment penalty is sufficiently large, the Stackelberg long-term
stationary price is larger than the Pareto price.
Figure 1 presents the ordering of the different prices when both Pareto and Stackelberg
equilibria exist for the situation when q = 0. An investment in distributed generation for
the social planner requires that ρc/b−θ is lower than ρh+pi. Moreover, since λδ
(ρδ+Kf )2
< 1,
P 0
F
is lower than ρh+pi. Further, PD is greater than ρh+pi. Besides, when the commitment
penalty λ tends to infinity, P 0
F
tends to ρh+ pi. The intersection of the two intervals that
define P ∗ and P 0 tends to reduce to only one point, namely ρh+ pi. And thus, we get P ∗
is lower than P 0 .
Figure 1: Ordering of different prices in standard situations for an initial condition with zero
installed capacity for both technologies.
It is not possible in all generality of the parameters of the model to show that the
Stackelberg price is greater than the Pareto price. Indeed, if the penalty commitment is
null, the Stackelberg price becomes P  = 12PD . Since PD is independent of pi and δ, and
whereas P ∗ is not, for large values of pi or small values of δ the Pareto price exceeds the
Stackelberg price.
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We do not push further the conditions of the parameters values that insures that the
Pareto price is lower than the Stackelberg, which is the normal situation in oligopoly pricing,
and focus on the contrast between the two equilibria when the commitment of the firm is
strong enough.
We consider again the two different initial situations that are discribed in section 3.3.
The first situation corresponds to the construction of a power system from zero. The initial
state of the system holds neither centralised nor distributed capacity. The second situation
corresponds to the most common situation of power systems where all of the demand is
satisfied by centralised generation.
Section 3.3 shows that whatever the relative cost of the technologies, when the penalty
commitment becomes large, the long-term cumulative distributed capacity invested by the
social planner tends to zero because the only way to ensure perfect matching between
demand and generation is to hold only dispatchable technology. Thus, whatever the initial
state of the system, the social planner will reduce the share of intermittent technology to a
small portion. This is not the case for the firm in a non-regulated market. If the firm starts
with no capacity, her optimal strategy is to let the intermittent technology take a dominant
portion of the demand and to make the consumer pay a high price for a small quantity of
her dispatchable technology. The reason for this behaviour is that by doing so, the firm
limits her investment costs. In this situation, the firm’s behaviour can be seen as making
the consumer pay only for the adjustment cost induced by the intermittency. But, if the
firm starts with a capacity that is close to the total demand, then the optimal strategy of
the firm is to block the entry of distributed technology. We summarize this result in the
following property, which is numerically illustrated below.
Property 4.1. In a situation where a power system is to be built from zero, the optimal
strategy of the firm is a high price with a low market-share. In a situation where the initial
power system consists only in centralised generation, the optimal strategy of the firm is a
low price with a large market share.
Further, suppose that for some reasons, the social planner wants to achieve a level of
distributed energy in the electric system that deviates from the equilibrium value given
by Proposition 3.3. One possible way to achieve this result is to impose a regulated price
of centralised electricity knowing that in this case, the consumer will react according to
Proposition 3.1. Nevertheless, at least in Europe, a gradual phase-out of residential reg-
ulated prices is on its way to let retail market price be induced by competition between
retailers (see EU Parliament text adopted on February, 5th 2014, paragraph 97) . Thus,
the regulator is left with two instruments, the carbon tax pi and the subsidy to distributed
technology to reduce ρc/b. Therefore, the question the regulator is left with is which in-
strument is the most efficient between the subsidy to distributed generation and taxation
of emissive centralised generation. The total cost of centralised generation ρh+ pi appears
in the Stackelberg long-term price multiplied by a factor λδ/(ρδ + Kf )
2. This factor is
lower than one. Thus, the efficiency of a carbon tax is technically lower than a subsidy for
distributed generation. Nevertheless, as soon as the firm’s commitment is large enough,
this factor is close to one, as it is shown in the numerical illustration following property
that resumes this result.
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Property 4.2. The carbon tax on centralised generation and the subsidy for distributed
generation have the same efficiency to achieve a given ratio of both technologies.
In terms of welfare,the comparison of the cost of the socially optimal arbitrage between
the two technologies with the total cost induced by laissez-faire Stackelberg equilibrium
is not straightforward. Indeed, if it is possible to compute the former, we are only able
to compute the stationary cost of the long-term Stackelberg equilibrium, which misses the
costs induced by the transition phase. Nevertheless, the numerical illustration below shows
that the two equilibria present large differences in terms of investment choice, that leads
without doubt to significant social welfare loss.
Numerical illustration. Based on the common order of magnitudes, we use the following
values for the parameters of the model: ρ = 0.1 per annum, σ = 0.3 per annum, b = 0.15.
The unitary cost c is such that ρc/b = 130 e/MWh. This value deviates from the data
provided by the IEA in its last edition of the Projected Costs of Electricity (2015), where
residential PV is granted at a median levelised cost of electricity of 250 USD/MWh at a 10%
discount rate. But, there are two reasons why the arbitrage between the centralised and the
distributed technology when distributed cost is close to 130 e/MWh is important. First,
the lower range of residential PV is close to 150 USD/MWh. Second, the arbitrage between
the two technologies depends on their relative cost and we want to study what happens if
distributed technology is competitive or nearly competitive with centralised generation. We
take a transmission infrastructure cost of θ = 50 e/MWh, and a unitary investment cost
in dispatchable capacity h such that ρh = 100 e/MWh. The market impact parameter for
both technologies are taken to be small compared to the investment cost αu (or c α) and
are in a range between 10−3 to 1 e/MW2/year. The aversion parameter to intermittency η
has an order of magnitude comparable to the electricity cost Pt(D−Xt). Since η multiplies
the variance of Xt, we take η = 8760×10−1 e/MW2/year. The demand level D is taken to
be 50,000 MW, which corresponds to an average demand seen from the distribution level
in France. The carbon tax is pi = 100 e/ton or equivalently for a coal-fired plant, pi =
100 e/MWh. The commitment penalty is taken as large as λ = 8760×1000 e/MW2/year.
With these values, we have P0 = 79 e/MWh and PD = 282 e/MWh. Moreover, one
has λδ/(ρδ +Kf )
2 = 1− 10−5.
P ∗ P 0 P˜ ∗ P˜ D
pi = 0, δ = 1 Price 80 272 n.e. 86
X̂∞ 0.3 47.6 0 1.6
pi = 0, δ = 10−2 Price 87.5 232 n.e. 113
X̂∞ 2.0 37.8 0 8.3
pi = 100, δ = 1 Price 87 277 80 91
X̂∞ 1.8 49 0.3 3.0
pi = 100, δ = 10−2 Price 127 259 87.5 140
X̂∞ 11.8 44.5 2.0 15.0
Table 1: Prices in e/MWh and distributed generation quantities in GW. (Left) initial state
holds for no generation capacities. (Right) initial state holds for only centralised generation.
n.e. stands for no equilibrium price. P0 = 79 e/MWh and PD = 282 e/MWh.
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Some remarks on the results of Table 1. We first look at the equilibrium prices and
invested quantities when the initial state holds no installed capacities. As explained in the
comments of Property 3.1 the more flexible the centralised technology, the more the social
planner invests in distributed generation. When the flexibility of the system is multiplied
by ten, the social planner doubles its investment in distributed energy. The Stackelberg
equilibrium leads to the opposite comparative static. The logic of the firm is here more
simple. If she bears less costs, she charges a lower price.
When the initial condition holds for only centralised capacity, the social planner does not
invest in distributed energy if there is no carbon tax. The arbitrage here is straightforward
since the cost of distributed energy is 130 e/MWh and the transmission cost is 50 e/MWh,
a carbon tax of at least 80 e/MWh is necessary to motivate an investment in distributed
generation. And, we see that even with a carbon tax of 100 e/MWh, this investment is
much more moderate than if the social planner had to build a new power system from a zero
situation. When we consider an initial state with only centralised capacity, the Stackelberg
equilibrium always leads to invested quantities in distributed generation that are much
lower than in the zero initial state situation. This means that the strategy of the firm is to
take a marginal share of generation when the problem is to built a new system from zero
but to avoid the entry of distributed generation when she holds all the generation capacity
in the initial state. With both initial states, the Stackelberg equilibrium always deviates
largely from the socially desirable outcome.
Further, by setting the transmission cost to zero, we can assess the question of the
social choice between two centralised generation technologies, one intermittent and one
dispatachable. In this situation, with the values above, we find a positive renewable energy
market share only if there is a carbon tax. And, at a 100 e/MWh level, we find a 14%
market share for a flexible system but a 2% market share for a poorly flexible system.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the interaction between electricity producers and consumers in-
duced by the development of affordable distributed energy sources. Our model uses recent
advances in the resolution of McKean-Vlasov optimal control problems with random co-
efficients to model the intermittency of renewable energy with its instantaneous variance.
We show that, in the long-term, the laissez-faire strategy leads to an over-investment in
distributed energy sources compared to the socially desired outcome and to a higher price
for the centralised energy. We have shown that in a situation where a power system is to
be built from zero, the optimal strategy of the firm is a high price with a low market-share,
while in the present situation of power systems where electricity demand is satisfied with
centralised generation, the optimal strategy of the firm is a low price with a large mar-
ket share. This strategy would yield the significant deviation in the market compared to
the socially desirable output. We have also shown that the poor flexibility performance of
dispatchable technology is an obstacle to renewable energy development.
These results are in line with the findings in the economic literature on the development
of intermittent renewable sources. Nevertheless, our model does not account for several
features that might erode the efficiency of the policy instruments we analysed, namely a
carbon tax or a subsidy to distributed technology, or that might translate into a market
equilibrium. First, the transmission tax should be endogenised to ensure that the consumer
pays only the relevant infrastructure cost and not more. Second, the transmission tax
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structure has a different effect on a consumer that is equiped with distributed generation
and one who is not. Thus, considering two representative consumers instead of one might
lead to a deformation of the installation of distributed energy. Finally, we considered that
the firm could only sell electricity while the main utilities are now also selling solar panel to
consumers and/or have plans to install ground field solar panels. Thus, a competition is also
possible between firms selling both electricity and solar panels. Taking into account these
differents features would result in a game model with too many non-symetric players to hope
for a tractable problem. For instance, only accounting for the distribution operator with
its regulated objectives would result in a moral hazard problem (see [21] for a quantitative
analysis of the interaction between regulator and distribution operators). These difficult
yet seducing problems are left for further research.
A Appendix
A.1 Consumer’s closed-form optimal behaviour
Theorem A.1. Let (3.3) and (3.5) hold. The optimal solar panel installation rate is given
by
αˆt = −bKc
γ
(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])− bΛc
γ
E[Xˆt] +
bθ − cρ
2γ(ρ+ b
2Λc
γ )
+
b
2γ
∫ ∞
t
e
−(ρ+ b2Kc
γ
)(s−t)E[Ps|F0t ]ds
+
b
2γ
∫ ∞
t
(
e
−(ρ+ b2Λc
γ
)(s−t) − e−(ρ+ b
2Kc
γ
)(s−t))E[Ps]ds, t ≥ 0, (A.1)
with the optimal cumulative production of distributed generation Xˆ = X αˆ given in mean by
E[Xˆt] = x0e−
b2Λc
γ
t
+
b2
2γ
∫ t
0
e
− b2Λc
γ
(t−s)
∫ ∞
s
e
−(ρ+ b2Λc
γ
)(u−s)E[Pu]du ds
+
θ − ρc/b
2Λc(ρ+
b2Λc
γ )
(
1− e− b
2Λc
γ
t)
, t ≥ 0, (A.2)
where the positive constants Kc > Λc are equal to
Kc =
γ
2b2
(
− (ρ− σ2) +
√
(ρ− σ2)2 + 4b
2η
γ
)
, Λc =
γ
2b2
(
− ρ+
√
ρ2 +
4b2σ2Kc
γ
)
.(A.3)
Moreover, if limt→∞ E[Pt] = P exists, the optimal cumulative production of distributed
generation admits a stationary level:
lim
t→∞E[Xˆt] =
P + θ − ρcb
2σ2Kc
=: Xˆ∞(P ), and so lim
t→∞E[αˆt] = 0. (A.4)
Proof. Given a candidate in the form of (3.7), our goal is to set the coefficients K,Λ, Y, R
so as to satisfy the condition in (3.9). By applying the Itoˆ formula and completing the
23
square with respect to the control, we get (3.10), where the coefficients are defined by
F (k, k˙) = k˙ − b
2k2
γ
+ (σ2 − ρ)k + η,
G(k, λ, λ˙) = λ˙− b
2λ2
γ
− ρλ+ σ2k,
Ht(k, λ, y, y¯, y˙) = y˙ − ρy − b
2k
γ
(y − y¯)− bλ
γ
(c+ by¯)− Pt − θ,
M(y, r, r˙) = r˙ − ρr − 1
4γ
E[(c+ by)2],
A(x, x¯, k, λ, y) = −bk
γ
(x− x¯)− bλ
γ
x¯− b
2γ
y − c
2γ
.
Conditions (3.11)-(3.12) then lead to the following expression for the optimal control:
αˆt = A(X
αˆ
t ,E[X αˆt ],Kt,Λt, Yt), t ≥ 0, (A.5)
where the coefficients are defined by
dKt =
(b2
γ
K2t + (ρ− σ2)Kt − η
)
dt,
dΛt =
(b2
γ
Λ2t + ρΛt − σ2Kt
)
dt,
dYt =
(
ρYt +
b2Kt
γ
(Yt − E[Yt]) + bΛt
γ
(c+ bE[Yt]) + Pt + θ
)
dt+ ZYt dW
0
t ,
dRt =
(
ρRt +
1
4γ
E[(c+ bYt)2]
)
dt.
The first and second equations admit constant strictly positive solutions Kt ≡ Kc and
Λt ≡ Λc, with Kc,Λc as in (A.3). The third and the fourth equations are linear Backward
Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDEs), with the immediate solution (for the coefficient
Yt, first compute Yt − E[Yt]) given by:
Yt = −
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+b
2Kc/γ)(s−t)E[Ps|F0t ]ds
−
∫ ∞
t
(
e−(ρ+b
2Λc/γ)(s−t) − e−(ρ+b2Kc/γ)(s−t)
)
E[Ps]ds− bcΛc + γθ
ργ + b2Λc
, (A.6)
Rt = − 1
4γ
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)E[(bYs + c)2]ds.
We notice that Yt is well-defined by Ho¨lder’s inequality and (3.5), whereas (A.7) will imply
that Rt <∞. We get (A.1) by plugging (A.6) into (A.5), while (A.2) immediately follows
by (2.1) and (A.1). By the procedure above, conditions (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 3.1 are
verified (we will later prove that αˆ actually lies in A). As for condition (i), we have to
prove that
lim
t→∞E
[
e−ρt(|Yt|2 + |Rt|)
]→ 0.
It immediately follows from the definition that E[e−ρt|Rt|]→ 0 as t→∞; as for the process
Y , we prove the stronger condition
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt|Yt|2dt
]
< ∞. (A.7)
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By Jensen’s inequality, Fubini’s theorem, the law of iterated conditional expectations, and
(3.5), we have:
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+b
2Kc/γ)(s−t)E[Ps|F0t ]ds
)2
dt
]
≤ 1
ρ+ b2Kc/γ
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
t
e−ρte−(ρ+b
2Kc/γ)(s−t)E[|Ps|2]dsdt
≤ 1
(ρ+ b2Kc/γ)b2Kc/γ
∫ ∞
0
e−ρsE[|Ps|2]ds < ∞.
We deal with the other terms in Yt by the same arguments and obtain the required integra-
bility condition (A.7). Let us now show that αˆ ∈ A, i.e. ∫∞0 e−ρtE[|αˆt|2]dt < ∞. By (A.5)
and (A.7), it suffices to prove that∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE
[∣∣Xˆt − E[Xˆt]∣∣2]dt <∞, (A.8)∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE[Xˆt]2dt <∞. (A.9)
By the Ito formula and the Young inequality we get, for any ε > 0,
d
dt
e−ρtE[Xˆt]2 = e−ρt
(− ρE[Xˆt]2 + 2bE[Xˆt]E[αˆt])
≤ e−ρt
(
− ρE[Xˆt]2 + 2b
∣∣∣E[Xˆt]( b
2γ
E[Yt] +
c
2γ
)∣∣∣)
≤ e−ρt
(
(−ρ+ ε)E[Xˆt]2 + cε(E[Yt]2 + 1)
)
,
for a suitable constant cε > 0. We get (A.9) by Gronwall’s inequality:∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE[Xˆt]2dt ≤
(
x20 + cε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(E[|Yt|2] + 1)ds
)∫ ∞
0
e(−ρ+ε)tdt,
which is finite for ε small enough. Similarly, we have
d
dt
E
[
e−ρt(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])2
]
= e−ρtE
[
(−ρ+ σ2)(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])2 + 2b(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])(αˆt − E[αˆt]) + σ2E[Xˆt]2
]
≤ e−ρtE
[
(−ρ+ σ2)(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])2 + b
2
γ
∣∣(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])(Yˆt − E[Yˆt])∣∣+ σ2E[Xˆt]2]
≤ e−ρtE
[
(−ρ+ σ2 + ε)(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])2 + c˜ε(E[|Yt|2] + E[Xˆt]2)
)
,
for a suitable constant c˜ε > 0, and then, by Gronwall’s inequality,∫ ∞
0
e−ρtE
[
(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])2
]
dt ≤ c˜ε
∫ ∞
0
e−ρs(E[|Yt|2] + E[Xˆt]2)ds
∫ ∞
0
e(−ρ+σ
2+ε)tdt,
which is finite for ε small enough, by (A.7), (A.9) and (3.3), so that (A.8) holds. Finally,
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the first limit in (A.4) follows immediately from (A.2) by noting that∫ t
0
e
− b2Λc
γ
(t−s)
∫ ∞
s
e
−(ρ+ b2Λc
γ
)(u−s)E[Pu]du ds
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
1τ∈[0,t]e
− b2Λc
γ
τ
e
−(ρ+ b2Λc
γ
)rE[Pt−τ+r]dτ dr
t→∞−→
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
e
− b2Λc
γ
τ
e
−(ρ+ b2Λc
γ
)r
Pdτdr = P
γ
b2σ2Kc
,
by the dominated convergence theorem, and recalling that Λc(ργ + bΛ
2
c) = γσ
2Kc. As for
the second limit, notice that E[Xˆt]− x0 = b
∫ t
0 E[αˆs]ds, so that
∫∞
0 E[αˆs]ds is finite, which
implies limt→∞ E[αˆt] = 0. 2
Interpretation and comments. The expression (A.1) of the optimal solar panels in-
stallation rate consists in several explicit terms that have the following interpretation: the
first term shows the mean-reversion of the production towards its mean due to the variance
penalization in the criterion, and we notice that the speed of mean-reversion, proportional
to K, increases with the penalty parameter η. The second term is related to the generation
uncertainty of the solar panels, and decreases the installation rate all the more so as the
current level of generation (on average) and its volatility σ are high. The third term, which
is negative, expresses the obvious feature that the higher is the fixed cost c on solar panels
installation, the smaller is the optimal rate of production. Finally, the fourth and fifth
terms, depending on the electricity price, quantify the natural intuition that the higher is
the expectation on the future price, the higher is the incentive to invest in photovoltaics
for self-generation. In particular, if we assume that the price Ps is constant and equal to
P , the expression (A.1) takes the following form:
αˆt = −bKc
γ
(Xˆt − E[Xˆt])− bΛc
γ
E[Xˆt] +
b
2γ
1
ρ+ b
2Λc
γ
(
P + θ − ρc
b
)
.
The last term for the optimal investment rate is a constant rate of installation whose sign
depends on the relative value of buying centralised energy at price P + θ compared to the
annuity of investment in distributed energy ρcb . If centralised energy is more costly than
distributed energy, then the consumer installs distributed energy at a constant rate.
A.2 Firm’s closed-form optimal behaviour
Theorem A.2. Given a distributed generation Xα, the optimal rate νˆ(Xα) for centralised
generation is given by
νˆt(X
α) = −Kf
δ
Qˆt(X
α) +
λ
δ
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+Kf/δ)(s−t)E[D −Xαs |Ft]ds−
pi + hρ
2δ(ρ+
Kf
δ )
, t ≥ 0,
(A.10)
with the optimal cumulative production Qˆ(Xα) = Qνˆ(Xα) given in mean by
E[Qˆt(Xα)] = q0e−
Kf
δ
t +
λ
δ
∫ t
0
e−
Kf
δ
(t−s)
∫ ∞
s
e−(ρ+
Kf
δ
)(u−s)E[D −Xαu ]du ds
− pi + hρ
2λ
(
1− e−
Kf
δ
t
)
, t ≥ 0, (A.11)
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and where Kf is the positive constant equal to
Kf =
δ
2
(
− ρ+
√
ρ2 +
4λ
δ
)
. (A.12)
When the distributed production process has a stationary level, that is limt→∞ E[Xαt ] = Xα∞
for some Xα∞ > 0, then the optimal cumulative production of centralised generation also
admits a stationary level:
lim
t→∞E[Qˆt(X
α)] = D −Xα∞ −
pi + hρ
2λ
, and so lim
t→∞E[νˆt(X
α)] = 0. (A.13)
In particular, if limt→∞ E[Pt] = P exists and we consider the optimal distributed generation
Xˆ = X αˆ, then the limit of the centralised production Qˆ = Qˆ(Xˆ) reads as
lim
t→∞E[Qˆt] = D − Xˆ∞(P )−
pi + hρ
2λ
=: Qˆ∞(P ), (A.14)
where Xˆ∞ is defined in (3.13).
Proof. A suitable adaptation of Lemma 3.1 holds. We look for a candidate in the form of:
vt(q) = Ktq
2 + Ytq +Rt, (A.15)
where the dynamics of the coefficients K,Y,R are given by
dKt = K˙tdt, dYt = Y˙tdt+ Z
Y
t dWt, dRt = R˙tdt,
for some deterministic process K˙, R˙ and F0-adapted processes Y˙, ZY . As in Appendix
A.1, we have assumed the quadratic coefficient to be deterministic. Moreover, since the
randomness comes from the F-adapted process Xα, the stochastic part in Y only depends
on W . By applying Itoˆ’s formula to Sνt = e
−ρtvt(Qνt ) +
∫ t
0 e
−ρs`s(Qνs , νs)ds and completing
the square, we get dE[Sνt ] = e−ρtE[Dνt ]dt, with
E[Dνt ] = E
[
h
(
νt −A(Qνt ,Kt, Yt)
)2
+ F (Kt, K˙t)(Q
ν
t )
2 +Ht(Kt, Yt, Y˙t)Q
ν
t +M(Yt, Rt, R˙t)
]
,
where the coefficients are defined by
F (k, k˙) = k˙ − k
2
δ
− ρk + λ,
Ht(k, y, y˙) = y˙ −
(
ρ+
k
δ
)
y + pi − 2λ(D −Xαt )−
k
δ
h,
M(y, r, r˙) = r˙ − ρr − 1
4δ
E[(y + h)2],
A(q, k, y) = −k
δ
q − y + h
2δ
.
Setting E[Dνt ] ≥ 0 for each ν and E[Dνt ] = 0 for ν = νˆ provides the optimal control
νˆt = A(Q
νˆ
t ,Kt, Yt) (A.16)
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and the following equations for the coefficients:
dKt =
(
K2t
δ
+ ρKt − λ
)
dt,
dYt =
((
ρ+
Kt
δ
)
Yt − pi + 2λ(D −Xαt ) +
Kt
δ
h
)
dt+ ZYt dWt,
dRt =
(
ρRt +
(Yt + h)
2
4δ
)
dt.
The first equation admits a constant solution Kt ≡ Kf , with Kf as in (A.12), while the
second and third equations are linear BSDEs, with immediate solutions:
Yt = −2λ
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+Kf/δ)(s−t)E[D −Xαs |Ft]ds+
pi − Kfδ h
ρ+
Kf
δ
,
Rt = − 1
4δ
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(s−t)E[(Ys + h)2]ds.
(A.17)
We get (A.10) by (A.16) and (A.17), whereas (A.11) immediately follows by (A.10) and
(2.3). Moreover, the conditions (i) and (iii) in Lemma 3.1 are verified by standard estimates
as in Appendix A.1. Finally, we get the limit result by the same computations as the ones
in Proposition 3.1. 2
Remark A.1. The value function of the firm is given by
V F (Xα) = Kfq
2
0 + E[Y0]q0 +R0,
so that we have
V˜ F (Xα) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−ρt(λ(D −Xαt )2 − Pt(D −Xαt ))dt
]
+Kfq
2
0 + E[Y0] q0 +R0,
with V F , V˜ F as in (3.16). 2
A.3 Social planner’s closed-form optimal behaviour
Theorem A.3. The optimal distributed and centralised generation for the social planner
are given by
α∗t =−
bK11
γ
(X∗t − E[X∗t ])−
bK12
γ
(Q∗t − E[Q∗t ])−
bΛ11
γ
E[X∗t ]−
bΛ12
γ
E[Q∗t ] +
Θ1
b
,
ν∗t =−
K12
δ
(X∗t − E[X∗t ])−
K22
δ
(Q∗t − E[Q∗t ])−
Λ12
δ
E[X∗t ]−
Λ22
δ
E[Q∗t ] + Θ2, t ≥ 0,
(A.18)
where {Kij}1≤i,j≤2, {Λij}1≤i,j≤2 are the unique symmetric positive-definite solutions to the
stochastic algebraic Riccati (SARE) systems:
b2
γ (K
11)2 + 1δ (K
12)2 + ρK11 − σ2K11 − λ− η = 0,
b2
γ K
11K12 + 1δK
12K22 + ρK12 − λ = 0,
b2
γ (K
12)2 + 1δ (K
22)2 + ρK22 − λ = 0,
b2
γ (Λ
11)2 + 1δ (Λ
12)2 + ρΛ11 − σ2K11 − λ = 0,
b2
γ Λ
11Λ12 + 1δΛ
12Λ22 + ρΛ12 − λ = 0,
b2
γ (Λ
12)2 + 1δ (Λ
22)2 + ρΛ22 − λ = 0,
(A.19)
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and where (Θ1,Θ2) =: Θ is a constant defined by
Θ = −1
2
(
Λ11 + ργ
b2
Λ12
Λ12 Λ22 + ρδ
)−1(−2λD − θ + ρcb
−2λD + pi + ρh
)
.
The associated cumulative productions (X∗, Q∗) = (Xα∗ , Qν∗) are given in mean by
E[X∗t ] =Γ11t (x0 − Φ1) + Γ12t (q0 − Φ2) + Φ1, (A.20)
E[Q∗t ] =Γ21t (x0 − Φ1) + Γ22t (q0 − Φ2) + Φ2,
where Γt = {Γijt }i,j∈{1,2} and Φ = (Φ1,Φ2) are defined by
Γt = Exp
[
−
(
b2Λ11
γ
b2Λ12
γ
Λ12
δ
Λ22
δ
)
t
]
, Φ =
(
θ− ρc
b
+pi+ρh
2σ2K11
D − θ−
ρc
b
+pi+ρh
2σ2K11
− pi+ρh2λ
)
.
The optimal cumulative productions admit stationary levels:
lim
t→∞E[X
∗
t ] =
ρh+ pi + θ − ρcb
2σ2K11
=: X∗∞(P ), and so lim
t→∞E[α
∗
t ] = 0.
lim
t→∞E[Q
∗
t ] = D −X∗∞(P )−
pi + ρh
2λ
=: Q∗∞(P ). and so lim
t→∞E[ν
∗
t ] = 0.
(A.21)
Furthermore, X∗∞(P ) is nonincreasing with respect to γ and δ.
Proof. A suitable adaptation of Lemma 3.1 holds. We use vector notations and a small
change of variable by setting:
δt =
(
bαt
νt
)
, Zδt =
(
Xαt
Qνt
)
,
so that the dynamics of Zδ are written as
dZδt = δtdt+ SZ
δ
t dWt, S =
(
σ 0
0 0
)
. (A.22)
The payoff is rewritten as g˜t(Z
δ
t ,E[Zδt ], δt), with
g˜t(z, z¯, d) = (z − z¯)′Q(z − z¯) + z¯′(Q+ Q˜)z¯ + T ′tz + d′Nd+ d′U,
where ′ denotes transposition and the constant coefficients are defined by
Q =
(
λ+ η λ
λ λ
)
, Q˜ =
(−η 0
0 0
)
,
T =
(−2λD − θ
−2λD + pi
)
, N =
( γ
b2
0
0 δ
)
, U =
(
c
b
h
)
. (A.23)
Correspondingly, we consider candidates in the form of:
vt(z, z¯) = (z − z¯)′Kt(z − z¯) + z¯′Λtz¯ + Y ′t z +Rt, (A.24)
where the dynamics of the coefficients K,Λ, Y, R are given by
dKt = K˙tdt, dΛt = Λ˙tdt, dYt = Y˙tdt, dRt = R˙tdt,
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for some deterministic processes K˙, Λ˙, Y˙, R˙. Since all the coefficients of the problem are
deterministic, we guess K,Λ, Y, R to be deterministic as well. By applying Itoˆ’s formula
to Sδt = e
−ρtvt(Zδt ,E[Zδt ]) +
∫ t
0 e
−ρsgs(Zδs ,E[Zδs ], δs)ds and completing the square, we get
dE[Sδt ] = e−ρtE[Dδt ]dt, with
E[Dδt ] = E
[(
δt −A(Zδt ,E[Zδt ],Kt,Λt, Yt)
)′
N
(
δt −A(Zδt ,E[Zδt ],Kt,Λt, Yt)
)
(A.25)
+
(
Zδt − E[Zδt ]
)′
F (Kt, K˙t)
(
Zδt − E[Zδt ]
)
(A.26)
+ E[Zδt ]′G(Kt,Λt, Λ˙t)E[Zδt ]
+ H(Λt, Yt, Y˙t)
′Zδt + M(Yt, Rt, R˙t)
]
,
where the coefficients are defined by
F (k, k˙) = k˙ − kN−1k + SkS − ρk +Q,
G(k, λ, λ˙) = λ˙− λN−1λ− ρλ+ SkS +Q+ Q˜,
H(λ, y, y˙) = y˙ − ρy − λN−1(U + y) + T,
M(y, r, r˙) = r˙ − ρr − 1
4
(U + y)′N−1(U + y),
A(z, z¯, k, λ, y) = −N−1k(z − z¯)−N−1λz¯ −N−1(U + y)/2.
Setting E[Dδt ] ≥ 0 for each δ and E[Dδt ] = 0 for δ = δ∗ provides the optimal control
δ∗t = A(Z
δ∗
t ,E[Zδ
∗
t ],Kt,Λt, Yt) (A.27)
and the following equations for the coefficients
dKt =
(
KtN
−1Kt − SKtS + ρKt −Q
)
dt,
dΛt =
(
ΛtN
−1Λt + ρΛt − SKtS −Q− Q˜
)
dt,
dYt =
(
ρYt + ΛtN
−1(U + Yt)− T
)
dt,
dRt =
(
ρRt +
1
4
(U + Yt)
′N−1(U + Yt)
)
dt.
The first and the second equation admit constant solutions Kt ≡ K and Λt ≡ Λ: there
exists a unique couple of symmetric positive-definite matrices (K = (Kij),Λ = (Λij)) which
solves the equations
KN−1K − SKS + ρK −Q = 0, (A.28)
ΛN−1Λ + ρΛ− SKS −Q− Q˜ = 0, (A.29)
i.e. the systems (A.19) (we postpone the proof to Lemma A.1). Similarly, the solutions to
the third and the fourth equations are given by Yt ≡ Y and Rt ≡ R, with
Y = (ρ Id + ΛN−1)−1(T − ΛN−1U) = (ρ Id + ΛN−1)−1(T + ρU)− U,
R = − 1
4ρ
(U + Y )′N−1(U + Y ).
(A.30)
Notice that Y,R are well-defined, since the matrices N and ρ Id+ΛN−1 are positive-definite
and then invertible (recall that Λ > 0). By plugging (A.30) into (A.27), the optimal control
writes
δ∗t = −N−1K(Zt − E[Zt])−N−1ΛE[Zt]−
1
2
(ρN + Λ)−1(T + ρU), (A.31)
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which leads to (A.18). Correspondingly, by (A.31) and (A.22) we have
E[Z∗t ] = e−N
−1Λtz0 − (1− e−N−1Λt)1
2
(ρΛ + ΛN−1Λ)−1(T + ρU)
= e−N
−1Λtz0 − (1− e−N−1Λt)1
2
(SKS +Q+ Q˜)−1(T + ρU),
leading to (A.20). The conditions (i) and (iii) in Lemma 3.1 are verified by standard
estimates as in Appendix A.1, and the limit is
lim
t→∞E[Z
∗
t ] = −
1
2
(SKS +Q+ Q˜)−1(T + ρU)
= −1
2
(
λ+ σ2K11 λ
λ λ
)−1(−2λD − θ + ρcb
−2λD + pi + ρh
)
=
(
θ− ρc
b
+pi+ρh
2σ2K11
D − θ−
ρc
b
+pi+ρh
2σ2K11
− pi+ρh2λ
)
,
which shows (A.21).
Let us now prove that the matrixK solution to (A.28) is a nondecreasing function (in the
sense of nonnegative symmetric matrices) of γ and δ. Indeed, notice first that K depends
on γ, δ only through the matrix N . It is clear from (A.23) that N−1 is nonincreasing w.r.t.
γ and δ, from which we deduce by comparison principle for the equation (A.28) that K is
also nonincreasing w.r.t. γ and δ. It follows that the first diagonal term K11 of K is also
nonincreasing w.r.t. γ and δ, and consequently X∗∞(P ) is nondecreasing w.r.t. γ and δ. 2
Lemma A.1. There exists a unique couple of symmetric positive-definite matrices (K,Λ)
which solves the equations (A.28)-(A.29).
Proof. Uniqueness immediately follows from (A.24). To prove the existence of the solutions,
we link (A.28)-(A.29) to suitable control problems. For T ∈ R+ ∪ {∞} and x ∈ R2, we
consider
VT (x) = inf
u∈UT
E
[∫ T
0
e−ρs(X ′sQXs + u
′
sN
−1us)ds
]
,
UT =
{
R2-valued adapted u = {us}s∈[0,T ] s.t. E
[ ∫ T
0
e−ρs|us|2ds
]
<∞
}
,
dXs = usds+ SXsdWs, X0 = x.
By arguing as in (3.4), it is easy to see that u ∈ UT implies E
[ ∫ T
0 e
−ρs|Xs|2ds
]
< ∞, so
that the problems are well-defined. If T is finite, we know (see [31, Sections 6.6 and 6.7],
with a straightforward adaptation of the arguments to include the discount factor) that
there exists a unique solution {Kt;T }t∈[0,T ] to{
d
dtKt;T = ρKt;T − SKt;TS −Q+Kt;TN−1Kt;T ,
KT ;T = 0,
(A.32)
and that for every x ∈ R2 we have
VT (x) = x
′K0;Tx.
It is easy to see that VT → V∞ as T →∞; as a consequence, there exists
lim
T→∞
K0;T =: K.
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By a classical argument and since the functions {Kt;T }t∈[0,T ] solve (A.32), K is a solution to
(A.28). Also, K is symmetric as it is the limit of symmetric matrices. Moreover, notice that
N−1, Q > 0; by standard arguments in control theory, it follows that x′Kx = V∞(x) > 0
for each x 6= 0, so that K > 0. By similar arguments, (A.29) admits a symmetric positive-
definite solution given that SKS +Q+ Q˜ > 0, since K11 > 0.
Lemma A.2. It holds: K11 > Kc.
Proof. Recall from Theorem A.1 that Kc > 0 is solution to the second-order polynomial
equation
F (Kc) :=
b2
γ
K2c + (ρ− σ2)Kc − η = 0.
From (A.19), we see that K11 satisfies
F (K11) = λ− 1
δ
(K12)2,
and it suffices to show that λ− 1δ (K12)2 > 0 to obtain the required result. Recalling from
Theorem A.3 that K = (Kij) is a symmetric definite positive matrix, we know that K11
> 0, K22 > 0, and |K12|2 < K11K22. Moreover, from the second equation in (A.19), it is
clear that K12 > 0. Let us now check that K12 < K22. On the contrary, we would get
from the second equation in (A.19)
0 =
b2
γ
K11K12 +
1
δ
K12K22 + ρK12 − λ
≥ b
2
γ
K11K22 +
1
δ
|K22|2 + ρK12 − λ
>
b2
γ
|K12|2 + 1
δ
|K22|2 + ρK12 − λ = ρ(K12 −K22),
where we used in the last equality the third equation in (A.19), which gives the contradic-
tion. On the other hand, by using again the third equation in (A.19), we have
λ− 1
δ
|K22|2 > 0,
and therefore λ− 1δ (K12)2 > 0 as K12 < K22. 2
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